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Abstract 
In this paper we show how propositional default heories can be characterized by classical propo- 
sitional theories: for each finite default theory, we show a classical propositional theory such that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between models for the latter and extensions of the former. 
This means that computing extensions and answering queries about coherence, set-membership 
and set-entailment are reducible to propositional satisfiability. The general transformation is expo- 
nential but tractable for a subset which we call Z-DT-a superset of network default theories and 
disjunction-free default theories. Consequently, coherence and set-membership for the class 2-DT 
is NP-complete and set-entailment is co-NP-complete. 
This work paves the way for the application of decades of research on efficient algorithms 
for the satisfiability problem to default reasoning. For example, since propositional satisfiability 
can be regarded as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP), this work enables us to use CSP 
techniques for default reasoning. To illustrate this point we use the taxonomy of tractable CSPs to 
identify new tractable subsets for Reiter’s default logic. Our procedures allow also for computing 
stable models of extended logic programs. 
1. Introduction 
Researchers in artificial intelligence have found Reiter’s default logic [ 291 2 attractive 
and have used it widely for declarative representations of problems in a variety of 
areas, including diagnostic reasoning [ 301, theory of speech acts [ 281, natural language 
*Most of this work was done while the first author was a graduate student at the Cognitive Systems 
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processing [ 251, and inheritance hierarchies with exceptions [ II]. Most importantly, 
it has been shown that logic programs with classical negation and with “negation by 
default” can be embedded very naturally in default logic, and thus default logic provides 
semantics for logic programs [ 4,161. 
However, while knowledge can be specified in a natural way in default logic, the 
concept of extension as presented by Reiter is quite tricky. Moreover, as Reiter has 
shown, there is no procedure that computes extensions of an arbitrary default theory. 
Recent research indicates that the complexity of answering basic queries on propositional 
default logic is very high (X;- or II;-complete [ 17,34]), and that even for very simple 
propositional default theories, the problem is NP-hard [ 19,331. 
In this paper we show how we can confront these difficulties by translating default 
theories into classical propositional theories. Our approach leads to the identification of 
a class of theories for which we have effective ways of computing extensions and testing 
set-membership and set-entailment, and to the identification of new tractable subsets for 
default logic. 
We introduce the concept of nzeta-interpretations-truth functions that assign truth val- 
ues to clauses rather than to logical symbols-and define when such a truth function is 
a model for a given default theory. Studying the properties of these models enables us to 
show that any finite propositional default theory can be compiled into a classical proposi- 
tional theory such that there is a one-to-one correspondence between models of the clas- 
sical theory and extensions of the default theory. Queries about coherence and entailment 
in default logic are thus reducible to queries about satisfiability in propositional logic. 
The main advantage of this mapping is that it reduces computation in default logic to 
propositional satisfiability, a task that has already been explored extensively. Moreover, 
our method introduces a deterministic algorithm for computing extensions of any finite 
propositional default theory, while previous algorithms 3 (e.g. [ 11,18,19,33] ) produce 
an extension only for certain subsets of all default theories. Our translation is exponential 
in general. However, there is a significant sublanguage which we call 2-default theories 
(2-DT), for which our translation is tractable. The class 2-DT includes the so-called 
rzetwork default theories-the default logic version of inheritance networks [ 1 l] and 
the class of disjunction-free default theories, in which formulas with disjunction are 
forbidden. It has been shown [ 161 that the class of disjunction-free default theories can 
embed extended logic programs; answer sets of the latter coincide with extensions of the 
former. Therefore, techniques developed for finding extensions for 2-DT are applicable 
for computing logic programs as well. 
As a by-product of our translation, we learn that the coherence problem and the 
set-membership problem for the class 2-DT is NP-complete and that the set-entailment 
problem for the class 2-DT is co-NP-complete. 4 The translation also provides a general 
framework for identifying additional NP-complete subclasses. Note that in general these 
problems are Xc- or II;-hard. 
3 Of course there also exists the brute-force algorithm, according to which you check for every subset of 
clauses, whether or not it is an extension of the theory. Though it is clear that it is sufficient to consider a 
finite number of such subsets, this brute-force algorithm is extremely expensive. 
4 See Section 5. I for details. 
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Once a default theory is expressed as a propositional theory, we may apply many 
existing heuristics and algorithms on propositional satisfiability. In particular, we show 
how topological considerations can be used to identify new tractable subsets, and how 
constraint satisfaction techniques can be effectively applied to tasks of default reason- 
ing. 
The rest of the introduction is organized as follows: in the following section we discuss 
the connections between default logic, logic programming, and inheritance networks, to 
demonstrate that the work presented here has a direct influence on computational issues 
in these fields as well. In Section 1.2 we will then give an introductory discussion about 
the basic ideas and contributions of this paper and explain its organization. 
1.1. Default logic, inheritance networks, and logic programs 
1.1.1. Reiter’s default logic 
We begin with a brief introduction to Reiter’s default logic [ 291. Let C be a first-order 
language over a countable alphabet. A default theory is a pair A = (D, W), where D is 
a set of defaults and W is a set of closed well-formed formulas (wffs) in C. A default 
is a rule of the form 
cr:p1,...,p, 
Y ’ (1) 
where Q,PI,...,& and y are formulas in C. 5 
A default IS can also be written using the syntax LY : pi,. . . , &/y. (Y is called the 
prerequisite (notation: pre( 6) ) ; PI, . . . , P,, are the justifications (notation: just( 8)); 
and y is the conclusion (notation: concl( 6)). The intuition behind a default can be 
stated as “if I believe cy and I have no reason to believe that one of the pi is false, then 
I can believe y”. A default (Y : P/y is normal if y = /3. A default is semi-normal if it is 
in the form LY : /I A y/y. A default theory is closed if all the first-order formulas in D 
and W are closed. 
The set of defaults D induces an extension on W. Intuitively, an extension is a maximal 
set of formulas that is deducible from W using the defaults in D. Let E* denote the 
logical closure of E in C. We use the following definition of an extension: 
Definition 1.1 (Extension [ 29, Theorem 2.11). Let E G C be a set of closed wffs, 
and let (D, W) be a closed default theory. Define 
(1) Eo= W, and 
(2) fori~O,Ei+l=Ei”U{yIa:pl,...,P,/yEDwhereaEEiand-pl,..., 
-Pn $ El. 
E is an extension for A iff for some ordering E = Uz Ei. (Note the appearance of E 
in the formula for Ei+l.) 
Many tasks on a default theory A may be formulated using one of the following 
queries: 
5 Empty justifications are equivalent to the identically true proposition true [ 3 11. 
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l Coherence: Does A have an extension? If so, find one. 
a Set-membership: Given a set of clauses T, is T contained in some extension of A? 
l Set-entailment: Given a set of clauses T, is T contained in every extension of A? 
In Section 6 we will also consider a special case of set-membership which we call 
clause-membership, where the set T is a single clause. 
In this paper we focus on propositional default logic. It has been shown that the 
coherence problem is X;-complete for this class and remains so even if restricted 
to semi-normal default theories [ 17,341. Membership and entailment for the class of 
normal propositional default theories were shown to be X;-complete and @-complete, 
respectively, even if T is restricted to contain a single literal [ 17,341. In this paper we 
will show subclasses for which these tasks are easier. 6 
It has been shown that the subclass 2-DT of all default theories is powerful enough 
to embed both inheritance networks and logic programs. The following two subsections 
elaborate on this. 
1.1.2. Inheritance networks and network default theories 
An inheritance network is a knowledge representation scheme in which the knowledge 
is organized in a taxonomic hierarchy, thus allowing representational compactness. If 
many individuals share a group of common properties, an abstraction of those properties 
is created, and all those individuals can then “inherit” from that abstraction. Inheritance 
from multiple classes is also allowed. For more information on this subject, see [ 11,371. 
Etherington [ II] proposed a subclass of default theories, called network default 
theories, as suitable for providing formal semantics and a notion of sound inference for 
inheritance networks. 
Definition 1.2 (Network default theov [ 111) A default theory A is a network theory 
iff it satisfies the following conditions: 
( 1) W contains only 
(a) literals (i.e., atomic formulas or their negations) and 
(b) disjuncts of the form ( LY V /?) where cx and /I are literals. 
(2) D contains only normal and semi-normal defaults of the form (Y : /3/p or 
LY : p A y1 A . A y,,/P where (Y, /3, and yi are literals. 
Etherington suggests formalizing inheritance relations in network default theories in 
such a way that an extension of a network default theory would correspond to a set 
of coherent conclusions that one could draw from the inheritance network it represents. 
Thus all the queries defined above (coherence, set-membership, set-entailment) are still 
relevant when dealing with network default theories. 
1.1.3. Default theories and logic programs 
Logic programming is a paradigmatic way of representing programs and data in a 
declarative manner using symbolic logic. Originally, the language used by logic programs 
was restricted to Horn clauses. Its expressive power was greatly improved after the 
’ Assuming the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse at this level. 
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introduction of negation in the body of the rules. This negation was generally interpreted 
as “negation by default”, not classical negation, resulting in a grounded predicate being 
considered false iff it cannot be proved from the program. For an overview of this field, 
see [21]. 
One of the most prominent semantics for logic programs is stable model semunrics 
[4,14,16]. Gelfond and Lifschitz [ 161 have shown how stable model semantics can 
be naturally generalized to the class of extended logic programs, in which two types of 
negation-classical negation and negation by default-are used. 
An extended logic program is a set of rules of the form 
~O-pl,...,pm,notq~,...,notqn, (2) 
where each of the r, p, and q are literals, and nor is a negation by default operator. 
Stable model semantics associates aset of models, or unwer sets, with such an extended 
logic program. 
Gelfond and Lifschitz established a one-to-one correspondence b tween extended logic 
programs and disjunction-free default heories by identifying a rule of the form (2) with 
the default 
p1 A***Apm :Nql,...,Nq” 
r0 
where N q is the literal opposite to q (- P = 1P, N-P = P). They have shown that 
each extension of such a default theory corresponds to an answer set of its twin logic 
program. A similar idea was introduced by Bidoit and Froidevaux [4]. 
The above discussion suggests concluding that any algorithm that computes extensions 
of a default theory will also compute answer sets of logic programs under stable model 
semantics. Moreover, any semantics attached to a default theory provides meaning to a 
logic program as well. 
1.2. The main contribution of this paper 
The exposition in some sections of this paper involves many technical issues, so we 
will first familiarize the reader with the basic ideas. 
In this paper we provide a way to translate any finite propositional default heory into 
a classical propositional theory so that the queries on the default heory are specifiable as 
queries about satisfiability or entailment in classical propositional logic. In order to give 
the reader a feel for this translation, we will present hree default theories considered 
in Reiter’s original paper on default logic [ 29 1, and for each theory we will provide 
the corresponding propositional theory. We will explain, without delving into technical 
details, the principle behind our mapping. 
Example 1.3. Consider the following default theory [29, Example 2.31 
D={$,$}, w=0. 
This theory has two extensions: {-C}” and {-D}*. We will now show how this result 
is realized using our translation. For each literal X in {IC, YD}, let lx be an atom with 
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the intuitive meaning “X is in the extension”. So, for example, 1-o has the meaning “7D 
is in the extension”. Applying this vocabulary, we will set constraints on the extension 
of (D, W). The default rule : C/-D imposes the constraint “if C is consistent with the 
extension, then -D is in the extension”, in other words: “if -C is not in the extension, 
then TD is in the extension”. We can write it in propositional logic as follows:7 
Tl-,C > I,D. (3) 
Accordingly, the default rule : D/X imposes the constraint “if 1D is not in the 
extension, then -C is in the extension”. We can write it in propositional logic as: 
+,D > 1-c. (4) 
If TD is in the extension, it must be the case that -C is not in the extension, because 
the default C/-D is the only rule that can be used to derive TD, and it will be activated 
only if C is consistent. The same applies for -C. Therefore, we add the constraints: 
14, 1 +,C. (5) 
I,C > d+. (6) 
If we combine the formulas (3)-(6). we arrive at a theory which has two models: 
M, and MZ. In Ml, 1,~ is true and 1-o is false. In kt2, I+ is true and I,c is false. 
MI corresponds to the extension {+C}* and M2 corresponds to the extension {7D}*. 
Example 1.4. Consider the following default theory 129, Example 2.21 
D= w = 0. 
This theory has one extension: { TD, ?F}*. We will now show how this result is realized 
using our translation. This time we use the vocabulary {I,c, I,o, I-,E, I.+}. The default 
rule : C/lD imposes the constraint 
+,C > I-D, 
the default rule : D/lE imposes the constraint 
TI-.o > 1-E. 
(7) 
(8) 
and the default rule : E/TF imposes the constraint 
++ > IYF. (9) 
Since extensions are supposed to be minimal, we assert that if -D is in the extension, 
it must be the case that -C is not in the extension, because the default C/lD is the 
only rule that can be used to derive TD, and it will be activated only if C is consistent. 
Same for -IE and TF. Therefore, we add the constraints: 
’ > is the usual material implication in classical logic. 
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I-ID > -‘i-C, 
IYE > -‘z-d), 
I+ > -hE. 
Since there is no default which derives X, we also add the requirement 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
If we combine the formulas (7)-( 13), we arrive at a theory which has one model, 
where the only true atOm are 1-D and I.+. This model corresponds to the extension 
{lD, yF)*. 
Example 1.5. Consider the following default theory [29, Example 2.6, p.911 
w =0. 
We will translate this theory as follows: 
The first formula constrains that the default rule should be satisfied. The second 
conveys the claim that since the extension is minimal, if it contains YA it must be the 
case that TA was derived using the only default in D, and therefore that TA is not 
in the extension. The propositional theory above is inconsistent, and indeed the default 
theory we consider has no extension. 
In the sequel to this section we will formally justify the translations illustrated above, 
present he general algorithms, and give more examples. The rest of the paper is orga- 
nized as follows: After introducing some preliminary definitions in Section 2, we provide 
in Section 3 the concept of a model for a default theory and explain the theory behind 
our translation. In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss how the models presented in Section 
3 can be treated as classical models of propositional logic. We present algorithms that 
associate for each finite default theory a classical propositional theory that characterizes 
its extensions. Then, in Section 6 we use constraint satisfaction techniques to show how 
our approach leads to the discovery of new tractable subsets for default logic. Section 7 
contains concluding remarks, and missing proofs appear in Appendix A. 
Before moving on, we would like to clarify a subtle but important point. Some of 
the decision problems we discuss here have been proven to be NE-complete or CO-NE- 
complete for some subsets of all propositional default theories [ 19,331. This means, 
almost by definition, that there actually exists a polynomial translation from these subsets 
to propositional theories such that queries on the translated efault theories are answer- 
able by solving satisfiability of the corresponding classical theories. The consequences 
of the work presented here goes beyond this initial observation. First, we can show a 
direct and simple translation: our translation does not require the encoding of Turing 
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machines in propositional theory. In other words, even for subclasses of default logic for 
which the above problems were shown to be NP- or co-NP-complete, the complexity of 
the translation we provide is much lower than the complexity implied by these decision 
problems being NP- or co-NP-complete. Second, our translation is pe@zct 8 -which 
means that each model of the classical theory derived from the translation corresponds 
to an extension of the original default theory. Third, our translation applies to the class 
of all finite propositional default theories-not only to restricted subclasses-and can 
therefore also be used as a tool for identifying additional subclasses of default theories 
for which the problem of coherence, set-entailment and set-membership are in NP or in 
co-NP In general the complexity of our translation is exponential, but if it is polynomial 
for some subclass, it means that for this subclass the problems of coherence, entailment 
and membership are in NP or in co-NP. 
2. Definitions and preliminaries 
We denote propositional symbols by uppercase letters P, Q, R, . . ., propositional literals 
(e.g. P, -P) by lowercase letters p, q, I,. . ., formulas by (Y,& . . ., conjunctions of 
literals by d, dl , . . ., and disjunctions of literals (clauses) by c, cl, ~2,. . . . The empty 
clause is denoted by LL The set of all resolvents of two clauses cr and c2 will be 
denoted by res( ct ,c2). The resolution closure of a set of clauses T is the set obtained 
by repeatedly resolving pairs of clauses of T and adding the resolvents to T until a fixed 
point is reached. 
A formula is in a conjunctive normal form (CNF) iff it is a conjunction of clauses. 
A formula is in disjunctive normal form (DNF) iff it is a disjunction of conjunctions 
of literals. Each formula has equivalent formulas9 in CNF and DNF. The function 
C’NF( a) (respectively DNF( cu) ) returns a formula in CNF (respectively DNF) that is 
equivalent to LY. Although a formula may have several equivalent CNF or DNF formulas, 
we assume that the functions CNF() and DNF() return a unique output formula for 
each input formula. When convenient, we will refer to a clause as a set of literals, to a 
formula in CNF as a set of clauses, and to a formula in DNF as a set of sets of literals. 
A propositional theory (in brief, a theory) is a set of propositional formulas. An 
interpretation for a theory T is a pair (.S, f) where S is the set of atoms used in T 
and f is a truth assignment for the symbols in S. A model for T is an interpretation 
that satisfies all the formulas in T. T t a means that LY is propositionally provable from 
premises T, and T /= a means that T entails a, that is, every model of T is a model for 
(Y as well. In propositional logic, T I- a iff T k a. Hence we will use these notations 
interchangeably. 
The relation < between interpretations is defined as follows: 81 ,< 82 iff the set of 
symbols to which 61 assigns true is a subset of the set of symbols to which 82 assigns 
true. An interpretation 0 is minimal among a set of interpretations I iff there is no 
9’ # 0 in I such that 8’ 6 0. 
’ We thank Mirek Truszczyfiski for suggesting this rather appropriate term. 
y Two formulas a and 0 are equivalent iff a /= p and p /= cy. 
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The logical closure of a theory T, denoted T*, is the set (w ( T k w}. How do we 
compute the logical closure of a theory T? Since the logical closure is an infinite set, it 
is obvious that we cannot compute it explicitly. However, when the theory is finite, we 
can compute a set that will represent the logical closure by using the notion of prime 
implicates as presented by Reiter and de Kleer [ 321. 
Definition 2.1. A prime implicate of a set T of clauses is a clause c such that 
(1) Tbcand 
(2) there is no proper subset c’ of c such that T k c’. 
The prime implicates of a theory T will be denoted by PI(T). As Reiter and de 
Kleer note, a brute-force method of computing PI(T) is to repeatedly resolve pairs of 
clauses of T, add the resolvents to T, and delete subsumed clauses, lo until a fixed point 
is reached. r1 There are some improvements to that method (see for example [26] ), 
but it is clear that the general problem is NP-hard since it also solves satisfiability. 
Nevertheless, for special cases such as size-2 clauses, the prime implicates can be 
computed in 0(n3) time. 
Throughout the paper, and unless stated otherwise, we will assume without loss of 
generality that all formulas we use in default theories are in CNR, W is a set of clauses, 
the conclusion of each default is a single clause, and each formula in the justification 
part of a default is consistent.12 
3. Propositional semantics for default logic 
An extension is a belief set, that is, it is a set of formulas that are believed to be true. 
A single classical interpretation cannot capture the idea of a belief set. In other words, 
we cannot in general represent a belief set by a single model by identifying the set of 
all formulas that the model satisfies with the belief set. The reason is that a classical 
interpretation assigns a truth value to any formula, while it might be the case that neither 
a formula nor its negation belongs to the agent’s set of beliefs. 
We propose to use meta-interpretations to represent belief sets. In meta-interpretations 
we assign truth values to clauses rather than to propositional atoms, with the intuition 
that a clause is assigned the truth value true iff it belongs to the belief set. If both P and 
7P are not in my belief set, they will both be assigned false by the meta-interpretation 
that represents my belief set. This motivates the following definition: 
Definition 3.1 (Meta-interpretation) . Let L be a set of propositional symbols. A meta- 
interpretation 8 over L is a pair (S, f), where S is a set of clauses over L and f is a 
classical propositional interpretation for the set of symbols Cs = {Zc ( c E S}. I3 That 
lo A clause ct subsumes a clause cz iff ct c cs. ca is called a subsumed clause [ 5, Chapter 51. 
” It is clear that this method will not generate all the tautologies, but these exceptions are easy to detect and 
handle. Hence, when computing prime implicates in the examples in this paper we omit tautologies. 
l2 Note that if a default has an inconsistent justification we can simply ignore it. 
t3 We chose this notation because intuitively, lC = true means that c is In the belief set. 
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is, f is a function from ls into {true, false}. A clause belonging to S will be called an 
atomic clause. 
We are usually interested in a belief set of an agent that is capable of making 
classical logical inferences. Hence, in order to keep the size of the meta-interpretations 
as manageable as possible, we can assume that if a clause is assigned the value true in 
the meta-interpretation, then it is as if all its supersets were assigned true. In the same 
spirit, an arbitrary formula n will be considered true iff all the clauses in CNF(cu) are 
true. These ideas are summarized in the following definition, in which we state when a 
meta-interpretation satisfies a formula. 
Definition 3.2 (Satis$abifir]v). A meta-interpretation 0 = (S, f) satisfies a clause c 
(~9 b c) iff either c is a tautology in classical propositional logic or there is an 
atomic clause c’ C c such that f( f,t ) = true. A meta-interpretation 8 = (S, f) satisjes 
the formula cl A cz A ’ A c, (0 /z cl A c? A . A c,) iff for all 1 < i < n, B /a c;. A 
meta-interpretation satisfies a formula Ly in propositional logic iff it satisfies CNF( cu). 
Note that this definition of satisfiability has the desirable property that it is not the 
case that, for a given formula a, 0 b (Y iff 6 &~a. 
Example 3.3. Consider the meta-interpretation M2 in Table 1. M2 RP, M2 &lP 
In classical propositional logic, an interpretation for a theory is an assignment of truth 
values to the set of symbols that are used by the theory. In analogy to the classical 
case, we now define which meta-interpretation will be considered an interpretation 
for a default theory. Meta-interpretations assign truth values to clauses, not to atomic 
symbols. So the question is which set of clauses should be represented as atomic 
symbols in meta-interpretations of a given default theory. We suggest that it will be a 
set of clauses that contains all the prime implicates of every possible extension, because 
this way we can make sure that each clause in an extension will be representable by the 
meta-interpretation. Hence the following definitions: 
Definition 3.4 (Closure). Let A = (D, W) be a default theory. We will say that a set of 
clauses S is a closure of A iff S is a superset of all prime implicates of every possible 
extension of A. 
Definition 3.5 (Interpretation). Let A be a default theory. An interpretation for A is a 
meta-interpretation (S, f), where S is a closure of A. 
Table I 
Three meta-interpretations 
IA I -A Its 1s I -P 17PVE 
Ml T F T T F T 
M2 F I F F F T 
M3 F T T T F T 
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It is easy to find a closure S of a given a default theory A = (D, W). For example, 
we can choose S to be the set of all clauses in the language of A, or the resolution 
closure of W union the set of all conclusions of defaults from D. However, in general, 
we would like the size of S to be small. We can show that the set prime(A), defined 
below, is a closure of A. 
Definition 3.6 (prime(A)). Given a default theory A = (D, W), we first define the 
following sets: 
l Co is the set of all conclusions I4 of defaults in D, that is, 
ff:P1,...,Pn 
C 
l p(A) is the resolution closure of CD and PI(W). 
We can now define prime(A) : Let A = (D, W) be a default theory. The set prime(A) 
is the union of p(A) - {A} and PI{ W). l5 
Proposition 3.7 (prime(A) is a closure). Let A be a default theory. prime(A) is a 
closure of A. 
Example 3.8. Consider the following default theory A: 
W=(TPVB). 
PZ( W) = {‘P V B}, Co = {e A, TA}, and p(A) = PZ( W) U CD U {B, A}. Therefore, 
prime(A) = {‘P V B, P, A, -A, B). 
As we will see later, this theory has two extensions: 
l extension 1 (El): {A,P,B}*, 
l extension 2 (E2): (7A,-P V B}*, 
and indeed prime(A) is a superset of all prime implicates of El and E2. 
We now want to build an interpretation (S, f) for A. For reasons to be explained later, 
we will choose s to be prime(A) U (7P}. So we get & = {I,PvB, Ip, I-p, IA, I-A, 1~). 
Since ICsj = 6, we have 26 different interpretations over this fixed S. Table 1 lists three 
of them. 
In classical propositional logic, a model for a theory is an interpretation that satisfies 
the theory. The set of formulas satisfied by the model is a set that is consistent with the 
theory, and a formula is entailed by the theory if it is true in all of its models. In the 
same spirit, we want to define when an interpretation for a default theory is a model. 
Ultimately, we want the set of all the formulas that a model for the default theory 
satisfies to be an extension of that default theory. If we practice skeptical reasoning, a 
formula will be entailed by the default theory if it belongs to all of its models. 
I4 Note that we have assumed that the conclusion of each default is a single clause. 
I5 Note that this definition means that A belongs to prime(A) iff it belongs to PI(W). 
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Since each model is supposed to represent an extension that is a deductively closed 
theory, each model for a default theory is required to have the property that if a clause 
c follows from a set of clauses C and for each c’ E C, I,! is true, then Z, is true too. 
Formally, 
Definition 3.9 (Deductive closure). A meta-interpretation 8 = (S, f) is deductively 
closed iff it satisfies: 
( 1) For each two atomic clauses c and c’ such that c c c’, if f(&) = true then 
f( I,/) = true. 
(2) For each two atomic clauses c and c’, if f( I,) = true and f( I,/ ) = true then 
13 b res(c,c’). 
A model of a default theory will also have to satisfy each clause from W and each 
default from D, in the following sense: 
Definition 3.10 (Satisfying a default theop) A meta-interpretation 8 satisjies a de- 
fault theory A iff: 
( 1) For each c E W, 0 /=z c. 
(2) For each default from D, if 6, satislies its preconditions and does not satisfy the 
negation of each of its justifications, then it satisfies its conclusion. 
We would also like every clause that a model for a default theory satisfies to have a 
“reason” to be true: 
Definition 3.11 (Being based on a default theory). A meta-interpretation B is based 
on a default theory A iff, for each atomic clause c such that 0 b c, at least one of the 
following conditions holds: 
( 1) c is a tautology. 
(2) There is a clause cl such that ci c c and 0 /z cl. 
(3) There are clauses cl, c2 such that B /zcl,cz and c E res(cI,c2). 
(4) c E w. 
(5) There is a default (Y : /?I,. , fin/c in D such that 8 tZ: CX, and for each 1 < i < n, 
0 &-Pi. 
Example 3.12. Consider the following default theory A: 
w = {}. 
Clearly, {Q} is a closure of A, and the meta-interpretation B that assigns true only to 
1~ is an interpretation for A. Note that 0 satisfies A but it is not based on A. Indeed, the 
set {Q}* is NOT an extension of A. 
We first define when a meta-interpretation is a weak model for a default theory A. 
As we will see later, for what we call acyclic default theories, every weak model is a 
model. 
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Definition 3.13 (Weak model). Let A be a default theory. A weak model for A is an 
interpretation 8 for A such that 
( 1) 8 is deductively closed, 
(2) 8 satisfies A, and 
(3) 8 is based on A. 
In general, however, weak models are not models of a default theory, unless each 
clause that they satisfy has a proof, where a proof is a sequence of defaults that derive 
the clause from W. 
Definition 3.14 (Proof). Let A = (D, W) be a default theory, and let 13 be an interpre- 
tation of A. A proof of a clause c with respect to 0 and A is a sequence of defaults 
St,... , S,, such that the following three conditions hold: 
(1) CE (WU{concl(St),...,concl(6”)})*. 
(2) For all 1 < i < n and for each pj E just( Si), the negation of pj is not satisfied 
by 8. 
(3) Forall 1 <i<n,p~(ai) s (WU{CO~KZ(G~),...,~~TK~(&_~)})*. 
Example 3.15. Consider the following default theory A: 
Clearly, {P, Q, R} is a closure of A, and the meta-interpretation 0 that assigns true only 
to IQ and Ip is an interpretation for A. Note that 0 is a weak model for A, but both P 
and Q do not have proofs with respect to 19 and A. Indeed, the set {Q, P}* is NOT an 
extension of A. 
Definition 3.16 (Model). Let A be a default theory. A model for A is a weak model 8 
for A such that each atomic clause that t9 satisfies has a proof with respect to 0 and A. 
Our central claim is that if a meta-interpretation is a model for a default theory A, 
then the set of all formulas that it satisfies is an extension of A, and vice versa. Formally, 
Theorem 3.17 (Model-extension). Let A be a default heory. A theory E is an extension 
for A ifs there is a model 8 for A such that E = {s 1 0 /z s}. 
This theorem suggests that given a default theory A = (D, W) we can translate queries 
on this theory to queries on its models as follows: A has an extension iff it has a model, 
a set T of formulas is a member in some extension iff there is a model for A that 
satisfies T, and T is included in every extension iff it is satisfied by every model for A. 
Example 3.18. Consider again the default theory A from Example 3.8, where: 
Recall that A has two extensions: 
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o extension 1 (El): {A,P,B)*, 
l extension 2 (E2): {TA, -P V B}‘. 
M 1 and M2 in Table 1 are models for -1. The set of formulas that Ml satisfies is equal 
to El. The set of formulas that M2 satisfies is equal to E2. M3 is not a model for 
A, because M3 is not based on A: M3 satisfies the atomic clause P but none of the 
conditions of Definition 3.1 1 are satisfied for P. 
The idea behind the definition of a proof is that each clause that the model satisfies 
will be derivable from W using the defaults and propositional inference. An alternative 
way to ensure this is to assign each atomic clause an index that is a nonnegative integer 
and require that if this clause is satisfied by the meta-interpretation, the clauses used in 
its proof have a lower index. Clauses from PI(W) will get index 0, and this way the 
well-foundedness of the positive integers will induce well-foundedness on the clauses. 
The following theorem conveys this idea. Elkan [lo] used a similar technique in order 
to ensure that the justifications supporting a node in a TMS are non-circular. 
Theorem 3.19 (Indexing and proofs). A weuk model 6 = (S, f) for A is a model for 
A if there is u function p : 5’ - N i such that for each atomic clause c the following 
conditions hold: 
( 1) c E w ifsp(c) = 0. 
( 2 ) If c $ W then at least one of the following conditions hold: 
(a) There is a default 6 = cy : /?I, , p,,/c E D such that 0 satisjies (Y and 
does not satisjj any of -,B, and, for all cl E CNF(a), there is an atomic 
clause cz C cl such that P(O) < p(c). 
(b) There are two atomic clauses cl und q such that c is a resolvent of cl and 
c?, 19 satis$es cl and cz, and p(c1).p(c2) <p(c). 
(c) There is an atomic clause c’ C c’ such that B b c’ and p( c’) < p(c). 
The above theorem is very useful in proving that for what we call acyclic default 
theories every weak model is a model for A. 
Acyclicity is defined as follows: 
Definition 3.20 (Dependency gruph). Let -1 be a default theory and S a closure of A. 
The dependency graph of A with respect to S, G J,S, is a directed graph defined as 
follows: 
( 1) For each c E S there is a node in the graph. 
(2) There is an edge from node c to node c’ iff c’ $ W and at least one of the 
following conditions holds: 
(a) c C c’. 
(b) There is a clause c” t S such that c’ t res( c, c”). 
(c) There is a default a : PI,. .,&/c’ in D and c E (Y. 
A default theory A is acyclic with respect to a closure S iff GJJ is acyclic. 
Hence, if A is acyclic with respect to S, the order that Cd,,y induces on S satisfies the 
conditions of Theorem 3.19. So we can conclude the following: 
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Fig. 1. Dependency graph. 
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Theorem 3.21 (Models for acyclic theories). If 8 = (S, f) is a weak model for an 
acyclic default theory A, then 8 is a model for A. 
Example 3.22 (Example 3.8 continued). The dependency graph of A is shown in Fig. 
1. A is acyclic with respect to S. 
We can also show that every model for a default theory is a minimal weak model. For 
meta-interpretations over a fixed set of atomic clauses, minimality is defined w.r.t. the 
following partial order: 6’ < 8’ iff the set of atomic clauses that 0 satisfies is a subset 
of the set of atomic clauses that 8’ satisfies. We will say that 0 is minimal among a set 
of meta-interpretations I iff there is no 8’ + 8 in I such that 8’ 6 0. 
Theorem 3.23 (Minimality of models). Every model of a default theory A is a minimal 
weak model for A. 
4. Expressing an acyclic default theory as a propositional theory 
An interpretation (S, f) for a default theory A may be viewed as a classical logic 
interpretation over S: Treat each clause in S as a propositional symbol, and the truth value 
of each such “symbol” will be the value assigned by f to its corresponding clause. Our 
next task is to identify among those classical interpretations the ones that are models of 
A. We will do this by constructing a propositional theory that these models must satisfy 
(in the classical sense). In this section we will concentrate on acyclic default theories. 
Given a finite default theory A which is acyclic with respect to some closure of A, S, 
we will show a propositional theory P~,J that characterizes these models: If ( Ls, f) is 
a classical model for that propositional theory, then (S, f) is a model for A; and, vice 
versa, if (S, f) is a model for A, then (Cs, f) is a classical model for ‘PA,,. In the next 
section we will generalize this approach for the class of all finite default theories. 
We will first demonstrate our method with an example. 
Example 4.1 (Example 3.8 continued). Consider again the default theory A from Ex- 
ample 3.8, where: 
W={lPvB}. 
Recall that A has two extensions: 
l extension 1 (El): {A,P,B}*, 
l extension 2 (E2): {TA,TP V B}*. 
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Let S={lPvB,l?+‘,A, -A, B} be a closure of A. A is acyclic with respect to S. 
For this theory, PA,, is the following set of formulas: 
(1) 1-P 2 IYPVB, IB 1 l+VB, IP A l,f’VB 2 IB, 
(2) I_ p,,B, IA A 71,P > [p, 71,A > 1.4. 71A > 1+, 
(3) iA > 7l-A, 1-A > ‘IA, IP > I/, A II+‘, IB 1 IP A I,pvB, ++‘. 
The classical theory PA,.7 expresses the requirements from a model of A. The first group 
of formulas expresses the requirement that a model for A must be deductively closed. It 
says that if one of B or 7P is true in the model then 7P V B should be true too, since 
B and -P are subsets of -P V B. Similarly, since B is a resolvent of 1P V B and P, if 
both of them are true then B must be true too. Note that we do not have, for example, 
the formula fYfr A i,p”B > lyp since -B does not belong to S at all. 
The second group of formulas expresses the requirement that the model should satisfy 
A. For example, since 1P V B belongs to W, the first formula in the second group says 
that TP v B must be true; since we have the default A : P/P in A, we add the second 
formula in the group, which says that if A is true in the model and 1P is not, then P 
should be true in the model. 
The third group of formulas says that a model for A should be based on A. For 
example, since the only way to add A to an extension is to use the default : A/A in A, 
the first formula in this group says that if A is true in the model, then the model must 
not satisfy -A, otherwise the default : A/A could not be activated; since no combination 
of formulas from W and consequences of defaults in A can derive 1P (except 1P 
itself), -P will not be in any extension, so PA., includes the formula -1,~. 
The reader can verify that Ml and M2 from Table 1 are the only models of PA,s. If 
we look at Ml and A42 as meta-interpretations, we see that the set of formulas that Ml 
satisfies is equal to the extension El and the set of formulas that M2 satisfies is equal 
to the extension E2. 
Before presenting the algorithm that translates a default theory into a classical propo- 
sitional theory, some assumptions and definitions are needed. From now on we will 
assume that a closure S of a default theory A contains all the clauses that appear in A 
and all the clauses that appear in one of the CNF of the negation of each justification. 
We will also need the following notational shortcuts: For a given A over C and a closure 
of A, S, we will define the macros in() and cons() which translate formulas over L into 
formulas over ,Cs. Intuitively, in(~) says that cy is satisfied by the interpretation, that is, 
for each clause c in CNF(cu), there is an atomic clause c’ such that c’ is a subset of c 
and I,, is true. in(a) is defined as follows: 
( I ) If cy is a tautology, then in(a) = true. 
(2) If (Y is an atomic clause c that is not a tautology, then in(a) = f,. 
(3) If LY is a non-atomic clause c and is not a tautology, then in(a) = 
Vd IS atomic,c’Cc ICI 
(4) Ifa=ci A...Ac,, then in(a) =/\,Gr+in(c,). 
(5) If a is not in CNF, then in(a) = in(CNF(a)). 
The function cons(p) is defined using the function in( ). Intuitively, cons(p) means 
that the negation of j3 is not satisfied by the interpretation. cons() is defined as fol- 
lows: 
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cons(P) = -[in(+l)I. 
The algorithm shown in Fig. 2 compiles a given finite propositional default theory A 
and a closure of A, S, into a propositional theory, Pb,s, that characterizes the models of 
A. The appealing features of PAJ are summarized in the following theorems. 
Theorem 4.2. Let A be a finite acyclic default theory and S a closure of A. 13 is a 
classical model for PA,s iff 8 is a model for A. 
Algorithm TRANSLATE-l 
begin: 
Step 1. PA,, = 0 
Step 2. %,s = %,s + {L ( c E W} 
Step 3. PA,S =%,s+{in(~~)Acons(/?~)A~~~Acons(/3~) > I, ) cr: /~I,...,/%/c E D} 
Step 4. PA,S = PA,S + {I,[ 2 Ic2 ) cl, c2 E ST cl c c2) 
Step 5. PAJ = PAJ + {L, A I,, II L, 1 CI,CZ,C~ E S, and c3 E res(q,c2)} 
Step 6. For each atomic clause c, define: 
SC = {cl 1 cl E S and cl c c} 
R, = {(cI,c~) I CI,Q E S,C E res(ct,c2)) 
D,={(wP~,...,kh,) (~:PI,...,&‘cED} 
SUBSET-reasons(c) = 
[ 1 V in(q ) Cl ES<
RESOLUTION-reasons(c) = 
[ 
V [in(cl) A idc2) 1 
(QXZ)E~L 1 
DEFAULT-reasons(c) 
= 
I 
V [in(a) Acons(j31) A-b-Acons(Pn)] 
(4I....$“,E& 
Step 7. For each atomic clause c $i! W, if SC U R, U D, = 8, 
then PAJ = PA,S + {I, > false}; 
else PA,s = P~,s + {I, > [SUBSET-reasons(c) 
V RESOLUTION-reasons(c) 
V DEFAULT-reasons ( c) ] ) 
end. 
Fig. 2. An algorithm that translates an acyclic default heory into a propositional theory. 
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Proof. PA,, states the conditions of Definition 3.13 in propositional logic, and since a 
weak model of an acyclic default theory is a mode1 of the default theory (Theorem 
3.21 ), the assertion holds. 0 
Corollary 4.3. Let A be u finite default theory which is acyclic with respect to some 
closure of A, S. Suppose Ipj.s is satisjiable and 8 = (S, f ) is a classical model for ?A,s, 
and let E = {c / c t S, 8 f= I(.}. Therl 
( I ) E* is au extension of A. 
( 2 ) E contains all its prime implicates (that is, PI(E) C: E). 
Proof. The first claim follows from Theorems 4.2 and 3.17. To prove the second claim, 
suppose c is a prime implicate of E and it is not a tautology. By definition of S, and 
since 3 has a consistent extension, c t S. Then, by the definition of PA,, and since 8 is 
a model for P,,,$, it must be the case that 0 b f,.. So c E E. 0 
5. Translating cyclic default theories 
So t‘ar we have shown that for any finite acyclic default theory A and a closure 
01‘ -I, S. WC can find a propositional theory, PA,J, such that if 0 = (S, f) is a 
classical model Ihr P~,,s, then 0 is a model for A. In this section we will general- 
i/e this result for default theories that might have cycles. This will imply that for 
any finite default theory, the questions of coherence, membership and entailment re- 
duct to solving propositional satisfiability. We will use Theorem 3.19, which suggests 
the use of indices to verify that the interpretations are grounded in the default the- 
ory. 
When finite default theories are under consideration, the fact that each atomic clause 
is assigned an index and the requirement that an index of one atomic clause will be 
lower than the other’s can be expressed in propositional logic. Let #c stand for “the 
index associated with c”, and let [#cl < #c:] stand for “the number associated with 
(‘1 is less than the number associated with ~2”. We use these notations as shortcuts for 
formulas in propositional logic that express these assertions (see Appendix B). Using 
these new index variables and formulas, we can express the conditions of Theorem 3.19 
in propositional logic. 
The size of the formulas #c and [#cl < #cz] is polynomial in the range of the 
indices we need. Note that we do not have to index all the clauses in S. We exam- 
ine GA,J (the dependency graph of A with respect to S): If a clause appearing in 
a prerequisite of a default is not on a cycle with the default consequent, we do not 
need to enforce the partial order among these two clauses. Indices are needed only 
for clauses that reside on cycles in the dependency graph. Furthermore, since we will 
never have to solve cyclicity between two clauses that do not share a cycle, the range 
of the index variables is bounded by the maximum number of clauses that share a 
common cycle. In fact, we can show that the index variable’s range can be bounded 
further by the maxima1 length of an acyclic path in any strongly connected component 
in G,,s [ I 1. 
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The strongly connected components of a directed graph are a partition of its set of 
nodes such that for each subset C in the partition and for each x,y E C, there are 
directed paths from x to y and from y to x in G. The strongly connected components 
can be identified in linear time [ 351. Note that, as also implied by Theorem 3.21, if the 
default theory is acyclic, we do not need any indexing. 
We summarize all the above discussions with an algorithm for computing P4,s for a 
finite default theory A and a closure of A, S. In addition to the one-place macro in( ), 
the algorithm uses a two-place macro in( LY, c) which means “a is true independently 
of c”, or, in other words, “CY is true, and, for each clause c’ E cy, if c and c’ are in the 
same component in the dependency graph, then the index of c’ is strictly lower than the 
index of c”. 
The function in( (Y, c) is defined as follows. I6 
( 1) If LY is a tautology, then in( (Y, c) = true. 
(2) If LY = c’ where c’ is a clause not in the same component in the dependency 
graph as c, then in( (Y, c) = Z,, . 
(3) If LY = c’ where c’ is a clause in the same component in the dependency graph 
as c, then in(a,c) = [I,/ A [#c’ <#cl]. 
(4) If CY = ci A.. . A c,, then in(a,c) = A\l<iGnin(ci,c). 
(5) If (Y is not in CNF, then in(ar,c) =in(CNF(a),c). 
Except for Step 6, which is shown in Fig. 3, algorithm TRANSLATE-2 is identical 
to algorithm TRANSLATE-l. 
The following theorems summarize the properties of our transformation. In all of these 
theorems, PA,J is the set of formulas resulting from translating a finite propositional 
theory A and a closure of A, S, using algorithm TRANSLATE-2 (see Fig. 3). 
Theorem 5.1. Let A be a default theory. Suppose %,s is satisjable and 8 is a classical 
model for PA-~, and let E = {c 1 c is atomic, 8 /= Zc}. Then: 
( 1) E* is an extension of A. 
(2) E contains all its prime implicates. 
Proof. Part ( 1) follows from Theorem 3.17 and the observation that P4,s expresses the 
conditions of Definition 3.13 and Theorem 3.19 in propositional logic. The proof of part 
(2) is very similar to the proof of part (2) of Corollary 4.3. 0 
Theorem 5.2. For each extension E* for a default theory A, there is a model 0 for 
P*,s such that a clause c is in E* iflO b c. 
Proof. Follows from Theorem 3.17 and arguments similar to those used in proving 
Theorem 5.1 above. 0 
These two theorems suggest a necessary and sufficient condition for the coherence of 
a finite propositional theory: 
I6 Note that in(a, c) may be undefined when c or (Y contains a non-atomic clause, but that is not problematic 
since we will use it only when this situation does not occur. 
132 R. Ben-Eliyuhu, R. Dechter/Artijicial Intelligence 84 (1996) 113-150 
Algorithm TRANSLATE-2, Step 6 
Step 6. For each atomic clause c, define: 
S,. = {cl ) c,cl E S and cl c c} 
R, = {(c,,q) 1 cI,c2 E S, c E res(c,,c2)) 
Dc={(a,P,r . . . . Pi,) la:P~, . . . . P,,/ceD} 
SUBSET-reasons(c) = [(L, ir*(c,,c)] 
RESOLUTION-reasons ( c) = 
i 
(~,~Fx~[in(cI,c) Ain(c*,c)l 
I 
DEFAULT-reasons (c) 
= 
v [ in(a, c) A cons( p, ) A A cons( &) ] 
(%Pl.....fA,)EJL I 
Fig. 3. Step 6 of algorithm TRANSLATE2 
Corollary 5.3. A default theory A has an extension iff P,,s is satisfiable. 
Corollary 5.4. A set of clauses T is contained in an extension of a defautt theory A iff 
there is a model 0 for P,,s such that for each c E T, B b in(c). 
Corollary 5.5. A clause c is in every extension of a default theory A @each model 0 
for P,,s satisfies in(c), in other words, iff PA,.7 k in(c). 
These theorems suggest that we can first translate a given finite propositional theory A 
to P,,s and then answer queries as follows: To test whether A has an extension, we test 
satisfiability of Pd,s; to see whether a set T of clauses is a member in some extension, 
we test satisfiability of PA.S + {in(c) / c E T}; and to determine whether T is included 
in every extension, we test whether PA,, entails the formula [ /jcET in(c) 1. 
5.1. Complexity considerations 
Clearly, the transformation presented above is exponential in general. However, there 
are tractable subsets. For example, if the default theory is what we call a 2-default theory 
(2-DT), then the transformation can be done in polynomial time and the size of the 
propositional theory produced is polynomial in the size of the default theory. The class 
2-DT is defined below. Note that this class is a superset of network default theories and 
normal logic programs, discussed in Sections 1.1.2 and 1.1.3. 
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Definition 5.6. A 2-default theory (2-DT) is a propositional default theory A where 
all the formulas in W are in 2-CNF and, for each default (Y : PI,. . . ,p,,/y in D, a is 
in 2-CNF, each /3i is in 2-DNF, and y is a clause of size 2 or less. 
A step-by-step analysis of the complexity of algorithm TRANSLATE-2 for a default 
theory A = (D, W) that belongs to the class 2-DT is shown below. 
Let n be the number of letters in .C, the language upon which A is built, and let d 
be the maximum size of a default (the total number of characters used to write it). 
We assume that S, which is the closure of A, is the union of prime(A), the set of 
all clauses appearing in A, and the set of all clauses that appear in the CNF of all 
negations of justifications. l7 Note that S can be computed in 0(n3 + ID(d) steps. I8 
We denote by 1 the length of the longest acyclic path in any component of Gd,s, by 
d, the maximal number of defaults having the conclusion c, and by r the maximal 
number of pairs of clauses in S that yield the same clause when resolved. Note that 
r < n. Let p denote the maximum number of clauses that appear in any prerequisite 
and reside on the same cycle in the dependency graph (note that p is smaller than 
d and smaller or equal to the size of any component in the dependency graph, so 
P < min(d,n)). 
Step 2: Takes O(n*) time. Produces no more than O(n*) formulas of size 1. 
Step 3: The reason we require the justification to be in 2-DNF is that we can transfer 
the negation of it into a 2-CNF representation i linear time. So Step 3 can be done in 
time O(IDJd) and (DI f ormulas of size O(d) are generated. 
Steps 4-5: There are at most O(n*) clauses of size < 2. It takes O(n*) time to find 
all pairs cl, c2 such that cl c c2 (one way to do this, is to allocate an array of size 
2n and store all clause with a common literal in the same bucket, and then produce all 
such pairs). Therefore, Step 4 takes O(n*) time and produces O(n*) formulas of size 
2. Similarly, Step 5 takes O(n3) time (use the same array as in Step 4, but this time 
you have to go over two different buckets: the one for an atom, and the one for its 
negation), and produces 0(n3) formulas of size 3. 
Steps 6-7: For this step, we first have to build the dependency graph of A with respect 
to S. This takes 0( ri* + JDld) time. We assume that at the end of the graph-building 
phase, there is a pointer from each clause to its component and to all the defaults for 
which the clause is a conclusion. 
For each clause c in S, the size of S, is 6 2 , the size of R, is O(r), and the size 
of D, is 0( d,). For any clause c’, computing in( c’, c) takes 0( E*) time and produces 
a formula of size 0(1*); for any prerequisite a, computing in(cr, c) takes 0( 1*p) 
time and produces a formula of size 0(1*p). Therefore, for each clause c, computing 
SUBSET-reasons takes 0( 1*) time and produces a formula of size 0( E*). Computing 
DEFAULT-reasons takes 0( d,( d + pl*) ) time and produces a formula of this size. 
Computing RESOLUTION-reasons takes O(n*) time and produces a formula of size 
O(r). Since we have O(n*) clauses, the whole step takes O(n*(1* + n*> + IDJ(d + 
I7 Note that the justifications are in 2-DNF, and hence their negation translates very easily into a 2-CNE 
‘* The reader can verify that the set of prime implicates of a set of clauses of size 2 can be computed in time 
0(n3) where n is the number of letters in the language. 
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~1’)) time and produces O(n*) formulas of size O(max(d,(d + pl*),r)). Note that 
lnax(d,(d+p12),r) < d,.(d+nl*). 
Proposition 5.7. For 2-DT, the above transformation takes 0( n2 ( l2 + n2) + ID ( (d + 
pl*)) time andproduces O(max(n-‘, ID])) formulas ofsize O(d,(d +n12)). 
The above proposition shows that there is a direct connection between the complexity 
of the translation and the cyclicity of the default theory translated, since for acyclic 
theories p = 1 = I. 
The complexity results obtained by Kautz and Selman [ 191 and Stillman [33] for 
default logic show that the satisfiability problem is polynomially reducible to deciding 
extension existence and membership in a subset of the class 2-DT, and that entailment 
in propositional logic is polynomially reducible to entailment for a subset of the class 
2-DT. Their results establish the NP-hardness of the existence and membership problems 
and the co-NP-hardness of the entailment problem for the class 2-DT. The polynomial 
transformation to satisfiability that we have presented in the last section implies that 
existence, membership, and entailment are in NP or in co-NP for the class 2-DT. Hence 
we conclude the following: 
Corollary 5.8. The coherence problem (i.e. extension existence) for the class 2-DT is 
NP-complete. 
Corollary 5.9. Set-membership for the class 2-DT is NP-complete. 
Proof. By Corollary 5.4, in order to check if a theory T is contained in some extension 
of a 2-DT A, we should check whether PA., U in(T), where in(T) = {in(c) ) c E T}, is 
satisfiable. Since A is 2-DT both P A,J and in(T) can be computed in time polynomial 
in the size of A and T. 0 
Corollary 5.10. Set-entailment ,for the class 2-DT is co-NP-complete. 
Proof. Follows from Corollary 5.5 above. i7 
6. Tractable subsets for default logic 
Once queries on a default theory are reduced to propositional satisfiability, we can use 
any of a number of techniques and heuristics to answer them. For instance, entailment 
in default logic can be solved using any complete resolution technique, since we have 
shown that it is reducible to entailment in propositional logic. 
Our approach is useful especially for the class 2-DT, since our algorithm compiles 
a 2-DT in polynomial time. So if a 2-DT translates into an easy satisfiability problem, 
queries on the knowledge it represents can be answered efficiently. In other words, each 
subclass of 2-DT that translates into a tractable subclass of propositional satisfiability is 
a tractable subset for default logic. Consequently, we can identify easy default theories 
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by analyzing the characteristics of 2-DT that would translate into tractable propositional 
theories. We will give an example of such a process by showing how some techniques 
developed by the constraints-based reasoning community can be used to identify new 
tractable subsets for default logic. 
Constraint-based reasoning is a paradigm for formulating knowledge in terms of 
a set of constraints on some entities, without specifying methods for satisfying such 
constraints. Some techniques for testing the satisfiability of such constraints, and for 
finding a setting that will satisfy all the constraints specified, exploit the structure of the 
problem through the notion of a constraint graph. 
The problem of the satisfiability of a propositional theory can be also formulated as 
a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) . For a propositional CNP theory, the constraint 
graph associates a node with each propositional letter and connects any two nodes whose 
associated letters appear in the same clause. Various parameters of the constraints graph 
were shown as crucially related to the complexity of solving CSP and hence to solving 
the satisfiability problem. These include the induced width, w* (also called tree width), 
the size of the cycle-cutset, the depth of a depth-first search spanning tree of this 
graph, and the size of the non-separable components [ 7,8,15]. It can be shown that 
the worst-case complexity of deciding consistency is polynomially bounded by any 
one of these parameters. Since these parameters can be bounded easily by a simple 
processing of the graph, they can be used for bounding the complexity ahead of time. 
For instance, when the constraint graph is a tree, satisfiability can be answered in linear 
time. 
In the sequel we will focus on two specific CSP techniques: tree-clustering [9] and 
cycle-cutset decomposition [ 71. 
The tree-clustering scheme has a tree-building phase and a query-processing phase. 
The complexity of the former is exponentially dependent on the sparseness of the 
constraint graph, while the complexity of the latter is always linear in the size of the 
database generated by the tree-building preprocessing phase. Consequently, even when 
building the tree is computationally expensive, it may pay off when the size of the 
resulting tree is manageable and many queries on the same theory are expected. More 
details about tree-clustering and its application to reasoning in default logic can be found 
in Appendix C. 
One of the advantages of applying tree-clustering to default reasoning is that it is 
possible to assess the cost of the whole process by examining the default theory prior to 
the translation step. We will characterize the tractability of default theories as a function 
of the topology of their interaction graph. 
The interaction graph of a default theory A and a closure of A, S, is an undirected 
graph where each clause in S is associated with a node. Arcs are added such that for 
every default 
CI /I~..~cCn:d,,+ ,,.... d,,,, 
CO 
there are arcs connecting co, cl,. . . , c,,, CM’( ldn+l), . . . , CNF( ld,,+,,,) in a clique; 
every two clauses c and c’ are connected iff they can be resolved, or c C c’, or there 
exist c” such that c = res( c’, c”). 
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A chord of’ a cycle is an arc connecting two non-adjacent nodes in the cycle. A graph 
is chordal iff every cycle of length at least 4 has a chord. The induced width (w*) of 
a graph G is the minimum size of a maximal clique in any chordal graph that embeds 
G. t9 The next theorem summarizes the complexity of our algorithm in terms of the 
induced width (w*) of the interaction graph. 
Theorem 6.1. For a 2-DT whose interaction graph has an induced width w* ,existence, 
clause-membership, and set-entailment 2o can be decided in 0( (Y * 2w*+’ ) steps, where 
CY is polynomial in the size of the input. 2’ 
Note that w* is always at least as large as the size of the largest default in the theory, 
and since there are at most 2n2 clauses of size 6 2 in the language, w* < 2n2. We 
believe that this algorithm is especially useful for temporal reasoning in default logic, 
where the temporal persistence principle causes the knowledge base to have a repetitive 
structure, as the following example demonstrates: 
Example 6.2. Suppose I leave my son at the child-care services at time tt. If he was 
not picked up by my husband, between time t2 and t,,_l, I expect my son to be there 
during any time t; between t2 and t,. This can be formalized in the following default 
theory (D, W), where in D we have defaults of the form 
at-school ( t;) : at-school( t;+ I ) 
at-school ( ti,. I ) 
for i = 1, . . . , II -- 1, and in W we have formulas of the form: 
picked-at( ti) > Tat-school ( t;+ 1 ) 
fori=2,...,n- 1. 
For notational convenience, we abbreviate the above rules as follows: 
si : Si+l 
Si+ I 
The interaction graph of this theory for the closure {si, us;, lpi, ‘pi V -si+l} (for the 
S;, i = 1,. . ,n, for the Pi, i = 2,. . , n - 1) is shown in Fig. 4. 
The reader can verify that w* ,< 2 for this particular set of problems. Thus, as 
the number of time slots (n) grows, the time complexity for answering queries about 
coherence, set-membership, and set-entailment using the tree-clustering method grows 
linearly. Note that according to Selman and Kautz’s classification [ 191, this family 
of theories belongs to a class for which the complexity of answering such queries is 
NP-hard. 
” A graph G’ embeds graph G iff G C G’ when we view graphs as sets of nodes and arcs. 
*” Recall the definition of these decision problems from Section I, I, I. 
?’ The input is the default theory and the set of clauses for which we test membership or entailment. 
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Fig. 4. Interaction graph for Example 6.2. 
The cycle-cutset algorithm is another method that exploits the structure of the con- 
straint graph. The cycle-cutset method is based on two facts: that tree-structured CSPs 
can be solved in linear time, and that variable instantiation changes the effective con- 
nectivity of the constraint graph. The basic idea is to instantiate a set of variables that 
constitute a cycle-cutset of the constraint graph, where a cycle-cutset is a set of nodes 
that, once removed, render the graph cycle-free. After the cycle-cutset is instantiated, the 
remaining graph is a tree, and we can apply the linear-time tree algorithm for solving 
the rest of the problem. If no solution is found, we have to try another instantiation 
of the cycle-cutset variables, and so on. Clearly, the complexity of this approach is 
exponentially bounded by the size of the cycle-cutset that is used. For more details on 
this method, see [ 71. 
We have the following complexity bound on reasoning tasks in 2-DT: 
Theorem 6.3. For a 2-DT whose interaction graph has a cycle-cutset of cardinal@ 
k, existence, clause-membership, and set-entailment can be decided in 0( a * zk) steps, 
where a is polynomial in the size of the input. 
7. Relation to Clark’s predicate completion 
In this section we discuss the relationship between the work presented here and 
Clark’s work on program completion. Clark [6] made one of the first attempts to give 
meaning to logic programs with negated atoms in a rule’s body (“normal programs”). 
He shows how each normal program Ii’ can be associated with a first-order theory 
COMP( n), called its completion. His idea is that when a programmer writes a program 
ZZ, the programmer actually has in mind COMP(IT), and thus all queries about the 
program should be evaluated with respect to COMP( II). So a formula Q is implied by 
the program iff COMP(l7) b Q. 
For the comparison between Clark’s work and ours, we consider only normal propo- 
sitional programs, that is, a set of rules of the form 
Q t PI ,..., P,,,notRt ,..., notR, (14) 
where Q, PI,. . . , P,,, and RI,. . . , R, are atoms. 
As discussed in Section 1.1.3, normal logic programs can be viewed as disjunction- 
free default theories by taking W = 0 and by identifying a rule of the form (14) with 
the default 
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P, A.. A P,, : 7R1,. . , TR,,, 
Q 
Hence we can treat normal logic programs as a subclass of all default theories, and talk 
about extensions of normal logic programs: those are the extensions of their correspond- 
ing default theories. 
Given a propositional logic program II, COMP( Z7) is obtained in two steps: 
Step 1: Replace each rule of the form ( 14) with the rule 
Q + P, A. A f,, A -R, A A TR,,,. 
Step 2: For each symbol Q, let Support(Q) denote the set of all clauses with Q in 
the head. Suppose Support(Q) is the set 
Q-Body13 
Q - Bodyk. 
Replace it with a single sentence, 
Q - Body, V v Bodyx. 
Note two special cases: If *‘Q +--” in Support(Q), simply replace Support(Q) by Q. 
If Support(Q) is empty, replace it with 1Q. 
Example 7.1. Consider the following program 77: 
P - Q, 7R. 
P-l! 
R - S, 
V-. 
The completion of 77 is the following propositional theory: 
P+-+[Q/\-R]vv (15) 
R - S, (16) 
1! (17) 
TS, (18) 
-Q. (19) 
There are interesting similarities between COMP(f7) and the translation we provide 
for the same logic program. If we take the program in the previous example and translate 
it using algorithm TRANSLATE- 1, we get that PI, is the following theory (note that 77 
is acyclic according to our definitions): 
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Iv, (20) 
IQA~IR>IP, (21) 
IS 1 IR, (22) 
Iv 3 IP, (23) 
Ip > IQ A -'IR v IV, (24) 
IR 1 IS, (25) 
+,+Q,{~~L 1 L E {e Q,RS,V}}, (26) 
{IL A 1,~ > false 1 L E {I? Q, R, S, V}}. (27) 
Combining sentences (21)) (23), and (24) and sentences (22) and (25) and re- 
placing each symbol of the form IL, where L is positive, with L, we get the following 
equivalent theory (compare to (15)-( 19)): 
P-[QATR]VY 
R t--) S, 
v 
1s. 
(4,~ 1 L E {E Q, R, St V)}, 
{L A Z,L > false I L E {E Q, R & V)}. 
It is easy to see that each model for the above theory is a model of the completion of 
the program and that each model of the completion of the program can be extended 
to be a model for this theory. The above example can easily be generalized to a proof 
of the following theorem, which was proved independently by Fages [ 131 and in our 
previous work [ 31: 
Theorem 7.2. Let II be a normal acyclic propositional logic program. Then M is a 
model for COMP( Z7) iff {Ip 1 P E M} is a model for Pn. 
Proof (Sketch). Let 17 be an acyclic normal logic program, C the language of 17, and 
Ph the theory obtained from Pn by replacing each occurrence of the atom Zp, where 
P is an atom in L: with the symbol P. It is easy to see that the set of models of 7’; 
projected on C is equivalent to the set of models of COMP(lI). q 
Corollary 7.3. Let II be an acyclic normal propositional logic program. II has an 
extension iff COMP(l7) is consistent. Furthermore, M is a model for COMP(Il) iff 
{P ( M(P) = true}* is an extension of II. 
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Proof. Follows from the above theorem and Theorem 3.17. 0 
Corollary 7.4. Let Il be an acyclic normal propositional logic program. An atom P 
is in the intersection of all the extensions of I7 iff COMP( I7) b P. 
Corollary 7.5. Let II be an acyclic normal propositional logic program. An atom P 
does not belong to any of the extensiorzs of II i# COMP( ZT) b 7P. 
The above observations identify the class of acyclic normal propositional logic pro- 
grams as a class for which default logic semantics (under “skeptical reasoning”22 ) is 
equivalent to Clark’s predicate completion. 
Note that if r/ is a cyclic program, our translation is different from Clark’s comple- 
tion: 
Example 7.6. Consider the following program ZIl: 
P + P. 
Q---P 
COMP(fIl) is the theory {P +~-- R Q -+ ,P}. PII, is the theory {Ip > Ip, 
Ip 2 Ip A [#Ip < #III], IO C-+ ~1~). Substituting lp with P and IQ with Q, we get 
that PI,, is the theory {P > P,P > PA [#P < #P],Q * ,P}. COMP(L71) has 
two models, in one of them P is true and Q is false, in the other P is false and Q is 
true. PI,, has only one model, the model in which P is false and Q is true. Hence PII, 
entails Q, while COMP(Z7,) does not entail Q. Indeed 171 has one extension which is 
the logical closure of {Q}. 
Another major difference between Clark’s completion and our work is that we handle 
all propositional default logic and not only the subset that corresponds to normal logic 
programs. 
8. Conclusions and related work 
Reiter’s default logic is a useful formalism for nonmonotonic reasoning. The applica- 
bility of default logic, however, is limited by the lack of intuitive semantics for the set 
of conclusions that the logic ratifies, and by the high computational complexity required 
for drawing such conclusions. 
In this paper we have addressed some of these problems. We have shown how default 
theories can be characterized by theories of the already well-studied propositional logic, 
we have presented a procedure that computes an extension for any finite propositional 
default theory, and we have identified new tractable default theories. 
*’ “Skeptical reasoning” means that a program entails an atom iff the atom belongs to all of the program’s 
answer sets. 
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The work presented here can also be viewed as an attempt to provide default logic with 
semantics that are in the spirit of the semantics of Moore’s auto-epistemic logic [ 271. 
The concepts of meta-interpretation and model for a default theory are in some sense 
parallel to the notions of propositional interpretation of an auto-epistemic theory (AET) 
and auto-epistemic model of an AET [27, Section 31. Moore defines a propositional 
interpretation of an AET as an assignment of truth values to the formulas in the theory 
provided it is consistent with the usual interpretations for classical logic (treating a 
formula of the form LP, where L is the “belief” operator, as a propositional symbol). 
Similarly, we define a meta-interpretation of a theory to be an assignment of truth values 
to clauses in the language of the theory. Moore defines an auto-epistemic model of an 
AET T as an auto-epistemic interpretation in which: (a) all the formulas of T are true 
and, (b) for every formula P, LP is true iff P is in T. Expansions in auto-epistemic 
logic correspond to extensions in default logic, and are supposed to be stable. Moore 
shows that an AET T is stable iff T contains every formula that is true in every auto- 
epistemic model of T. We define a model for a default theory in such a way that all 
the formulas satisfied by a certain model of the default theory are an extension of the 
theory. 
Using the theory of meta-interpretations and models for propositional default theo- 
ries, we presented an algorithm that compiles any finite default theory into a classical 
propositional theory, such that models of the last coincide with extensions of the first. 
This means that queries on default theories are reducible to propositional satisfiability, 
a problem that has been comprehensively explored. For instance, in order to compute 
whether a formula is in every extension of a default theory, we no longer need to 
compute or count all the extensions, since the problem of entailment in default logic is 
reduced to propositional provability. 
In general, the translation algorithm is exponential, but it is polynomial for the class 2- 
DT, which is expressive enough to embed inheritance networks and logic programs. This 
leads to the observation that membership and coherence are NP-complete and entailment 
is co-NP-complete for the class 2-DT. Using constraint satisfaction techniques, we have 
identified tractable subclasses of 2-DT. We have shown how problems in temporal 
reasoning can be solved efficiently using the tree-clustering algorithm. 
Related results for auto-epistemic logic were reported in [24], where it was shown 
that the question of an atom’s membership in every expansion of an auto-epistemic 
theory is reducible to propositional provability. Also, Elkan [lo] has shown that stable 
models of a logic program with no classical negation can be represented as models 
of propositional logic. Thus our work extends his results for the full power of default 
logic. In [ 31, we used a technique similar to the one presented here for computing stable 
models of disjunctive logic programs. We have also shown that there is an interesting 
relationship between the translation presented in this paper and what is called Clark’s 
predicate completion [ 61. A preliminary version of this work appears in [ 21. 
There have been attempts in the past to relate default logic to other forms of non- 
monotonic reasoning systems, such as auto-epistemic logic, circumscription, and TMS 
[ 12,18,20,23]. We believe that embedding default logic in classical logic is just as 
valuable since classical logic is a well-understood formalism supported by a large body 
of computational knowledge. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
A. 1. Useful theorem and definitions 
Definition A.1 (see [ 22 ] ). If S is any set of clauses, then the resolution of S, denoted 
by R(S), is the set consisting of the members of S together with all the resolvents of 
the pairs of members of S. 
Definition A.2 (see 1221). If S is any set of clauses, then the nth resolution of S, 
denoted by R”(S), is delined for n 3 0 as follows: R” = S, and for II > 0, R”+’ (S) = 
R(R”(S)). 
Theorem A.3 (see [ 22 ] ). Given a set S of clauses, if a clause c is a logical con- 
sequence of S wlhich is not a tuutology, then for some n 3 0, there exists a clause 
c’ E R”(S) , .such that c’ C c. 
Proposition A.4 Suppose c’, ~‘1, c, c{ md ci are clauses, c{ i cl, ci C c2, and 
c E res( ~1, ~2). Then at least one of the following conditions must hold: 
( 1) c; c: c. 
(2) c; c c. 
(3) There is c’ C c such that c’ E res(cl,cij. 
Proof. suppose 
C] =qvz? 
c2 = ca v -P, 
c = q v c.$. 
and suppose that both conditions ( 1) and (2) do not hold. Then it must be that 
c; = cs v P, c; = Ch v -P, 
where q is a subset of ci and cb is a subset of cd. Clearly, cg V c(j is both a resolvent 
of ci and ci and a subset of c. 
Theorem AS. (see [29, Corollary 2.21) A closed default theory (D, W) has an in- 
consistent extension iff W is inconsistent. 
A.2. Proofs of propositions und theorems 
Proposition 3.7 (prime(A) is a closure)). Let A be a default theory. prime(A) is a 
closure of A. 
Proof. Suppose E is an extension of A = (D, W). Since Pl( E) C E, it is sufficient 
to show that for each c E E there is a clause c’ in prime(A) such that c’ c c. If E 
is inconsistent, then by Theorem A.5, W is inconsistent, so n E PZ( W), and so A E 
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ptime( A). Suppose E is consistent. By Definition 1.1, for some ordering, E = Us Ei, 
where Ei is as defined there. We will show that for each c E E, there is a clause c’ in 
prime(A) fl E such that c’ C_ c. The proof is by induction on min(c), where min( c) is 
the minimum i such that c E Ei. 
Case min( c) = 0. In this case, it must be that c E W. Our claim is true since 
PZ( W) c prime(A) fl E. 
Induction step. Assume the claim is true for min(c) = n, where n > 0, show that it 
is true for n + 1. Note that c # A, since E is consistent. 
Suppose c was introduced first at E,,+l. So either c E CD or E, b c. If c E CD, 
then clearly our assertion holds. Assume E, k c. By Theorem A.3, for some j, there 
is c” E Rj(E,,) such that c” 2 c. We will show by induction on a minimum such j 
that there is c’ E prime(A) n E such that c’ G c. For j = 0, this is clear due to the 
induction hypothesis on n. For j > 0, let cl, c2 be clauses in R’( E,), 1 < j, such that 
c” E res( cl, ~2). By the induction hypothesis, there are c{, ci in prime(A) n E such 
that ci C cl, ci G ~2. By Proposition A.4, either c{ C c” or CL 2 c” or there is c3 in 
res( c{ , c&) such that c3 & c”. ptime( A) n E is closed by resolution (unless the resolvent 
is A, but cg E E and hence c3 + A). So cg E prime(A) n E. 
Theorem 3.17 (Model-extension). Let A be a default heory. A theory E is an extension 
for A iff there is a model 19 for A such that E = {s 1 8 b s}. 
Proof. Let A = (D, W) be a default theory and 0 = (S, f) a model of A. Let A be the 
set of all clauses that B satisfies. We will show that A is an extension23 of A. 
We define 
(1) Eo=W, 
(2) for i > 0, EL+, = Et! U {C ( LY : PI,. . . ,&/c E D where (Y E Ei and --~pi,. . . , 
-/?,, $ A and c E A}, and 
(3) E=&EEi. 
It is easy to verify that E C A. We will show that A 2 E, and thus by Definition 1.1, 
A is an extension of A. 
Let c E A. By definition, c has a proof with respect to (S, f) and A. By induction on 
the number of defaults used in the shortest proof, we can easily show that c E E. 
To prove the other direction, suppose E is an extension of A. Let S = prime( A). We 
will show that 0 = (S, f’) is a model of A, where f’ is defined as 
forallcES, f’(c>=true w CEE. 
It is easy to verify that 0 is deductively closed and satisfies A. By Definition 1.1, there 
are sets Eo, El,. . . such that 
(1) Eo=W, 
(2) for i > 0, Ei+l = Ef U {c 1 a : 01,. . . ,P,,/c E D where LY 6 Ei and lpi,. . . , 
-A, $! E}, and 
(3) E=UsEi. 
23 Without loss of generality, we assume in this proof that an extension is a set of clauses, and all formulas 
in A are in CNF. 
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By induction on the minimal i such that an arbitrary clause c belongs to E,, we can 
show that c has a proof with respect to 0 and A. So every atomic clause that 19 satisfies 
has a proof with respect to 6’ and A. It is left to show that B is based on A. Let c be an 
atomic clause. By induction on i, the minimum number of defaults used in a proof for 
c, we will show that one of the conditions of Definition 3.11 holds for c. 
Case i = 0. It must be the case that W b c, and hence c is in every extension of A. 
Let E be an extension of A. Since S includes all prime implicates of E, and 0 satisfies 
c, there must be a clause c’ E S such that c’ C c and 8 satisfies c’. If c’ # c we are 
done. Else, c is a prime implicate of E, and so there must be two clauses cl, c2 in E 
such that c E res(ct , c2 1. By definition, 8 satisfies CI and ~2. So item (3) of Definition 
3.11 holds for c. 
Case i > 0. So either c is a consequence of some default S and item (5) of Definition 
3.11 holds for c, or c is a logical consequence of some set of clauses C C E, in which 
case one of items ( l)-(3) must hold for c. q 
Theorem 3.19 (Indexing and proofs). A weak model 0 = (S, f) for A is a model iff 
there is a function p : S + N+ such that for each atomic clause c the following 
conditions hold: 
(1) CE w #p(c) =o. 
(2) If c $! W then at least one of the following conditions hold 
(a) There is a default 6 = a : PI, . . , p,/c E D such that 8 satisfies a and 
does not satisfjt any of -/3,, and for all cl E CNF( a), there is an atomic 
clause c2 C cl such that p(q) < p(c). 
(b) There are two atomic clauses cl and c2 such that c is a resolvent of cl and 
CZ, B satisjiesc) andc2, andp(cl),p(cz) <p(c). 
(c) There is an atomic clause c’ c c such that 0 /z c’ and p(c’) < p(c). 
Proof. We can show that each atomic clause has a proof with respect to 0 and A by 
induction on p(c). 
Case p(c) = 0. In this case c t W, so clearly c has a proof. 
Case p(c) > 0. In this case c follows from other clauses using classical logic or the 
default rules. Those other clauses have proofs by the induction hypothesis. Hence c has 
a proof as well. 0 
Theorem 3.21 (Models for acyclic theories). If 0 = (S, f) is a weak model for an 
acyclic default theory A, then 6 is a model for A. 
Proof. If the theory is acyclic, the dependency graph induces on S an ordering that 
complies with the requirements stated in Theorem 3.19. q 
Theorem 3.23 (Minimality of models). Ever?; model of a default theory A is a minimal 
weak model for A. 
Proof. Suppose that 8 = (S, f) is a model for A. Obviously, it is a weak model. We 
want to show it is minimal. By definition, for each atomic clause c in S there is a proof 
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of c with respect to 0 and A. Assume by contradiction that 8 is not minimal. So there 
must be a weak model 8’ = (S, f’) such that A- c A, where 
A- = {c ) c is atomic, f’(c) = true}, 
A = {c 1 c is atomic, f(c) = true}. 
We will show that if c has a proof with respect to A and 13, it must be satisfied by 0’, 
and so A C_ A--a contradiction. The proof will proceed by induction on n, the number 
of defaults used in the proof of c. If n = 0, the assertion is clear since c E W*. In the 
event that the proof of c uses the defaults 61,. . . , &+I, we observe, using the induction 
hypothesis, that ( W U {concl( 61) , . . . , concl( 6,))) * is satisfied by 8’. Therefore, since 
8’ must satisfy A, it must also satisfy concl(6 ,,+I), and since it is deductively closed, it 
must satisfy W U {concf(St ), . . . , co&( &+I)}*, so it satisfies c. 0 
Theorem 6.3. For a 2-DT whose interaction graph has a cycle-cutset of canfinality k, 
existence, clause-membership, and set-entailment can be decided in O(a * 2&) steps, 
where cy is polynomial in the size of the input. 
Proof. Satisfiability of a theory whose constraint graph has a cycle-cutset of cardinality 
k can be solved in time 0(n2k), where n is the number of letters in the theory [ 71. 
The interaction graph of a default theory A with a closure S is isomorphic to the 
constraint graph of PQ. Now, let A be a 2-DT with a closure S. Since A is a 2-DT, 
any clause in S is of size 6 2, and P 4,~ can be computed in time polynomial in the 
length of A. Since the constraint graph of P A,J has a cycle-cutset of size k, satisfiability 
of P4,s can be checked in time O(cu02~) where CEO is polynomial in the size of P,Q. 
By Corollary 5.3, A is coherent iff P 4,s is satisfiable. Hence coherence of A can be 
checked in time 0( a12~), where cq is polynomial in the size of the input. By Corollary 
5.4, to check whether a clause c is a member of an extension of A, we have to check 
whether there is a model of P4,s which satisfies some subset of c which belongs to S. 
Since A is 2-DT, there are at most 0( ]c12) clauses c’ such that c’ C c, c’ E S, and 
so clause-membership for the class 2-DT can be computed in time O(c~22~) where 9 
is polynomial in the size of the input. By Corollary 5.5, to answer whether a set of 
clauses T is included in all the extensions of A, it is enough to check whether there is 
some clause c in T which some model of P4.s does not satisfy. Hence we have to check 
whether there is a model of PA,S that satisfies lc’ for some c’ E S which is a subset of 
some c E T. Since A is 2-DT, for any c in T there are at most 0( ]c12> clauses c’ such 
that c’ C c, c’ E S, and so set-entailment for the class 2-DT can be computed in time 
O(~q2~) where cq is polynomial in the size of the input. Take LY to be the maximum 
of {q 1 i=O,1,2,3}. Cl 
Appendix B. Expressing indexes in propositional logic 
Suppose we are given a set of symbols L to each of which we want to assign an 
index variable within the range l-m. 
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We define a new set of symbols: L’ = {e P = 1, P = 2,. . , P = m / P E L}, where 
P = i for i = 1,. , m denote propositional letters with the intuition “P will get the 
number i” behind it. For each P in C’, let #P be the following set of formulas: 
P=IVP=2V..+P=m. 
P=l > [-(P=2)A -~(P=3)~...,?~1(P=m)], 
P=2>[-(P=3)Am7(P=4)A..A7(P=m)], 
P=m- 13 T(P=m) 
The set #P simply states that p must be assigned one and only one number. 
For each P and Q in C’, let [#P< #Q], which intuitively means “the number of P 
is less than the number of Q”, denote the disjunction of the following set of formulas: 
P=IAQ=2,P=lAQ=3 ,..., P=IAQ=m, 
P=2AQ=3, . . . . P=2/IQ=m. 
P=m-lr\Q=m 
Thus, for each symbol P to which we want to assign an index, we add #P to the 
theory, and then we can use the notation [#P < #Q] to express the order between 
indexes. 
Appendix C. Tree-clustering for default reasoning 
The tree-clustering scheme [9] has a tree-building phase and a query-processing 
phase. The first phase of tree-clustering is restated for propositional theories in Fig. C.1. 
It uses the triangulation algorithm, which transforms any graph into a chordal 24 graph 
by adding edges to it [36]. The triangulation algorithm consists of two steps: 
Step 1. Select an ordering for the nodes (various heuristics for good orderings are 
available). 
Step 2. Fill in edges recursively between any two non-adjacent nodes that are con- 
nected via nodes higher up in the ordering. 
Since the most costly operation within the tree-building algorithm is generating all 
the submodels of each clique (Step 4), the time and space complexity is 0( 17’)n21cl), 
where ICI is the size of the largest clique in the chordal constraint graph generated in 
Step 1, jTI the size of the theory and n is the number of letters used in T. It can be 
shown that /Cl = w* + 1. As a result, for classes having a bounded induced width, this 
method is tractable. 
24 A graph is chordal if every cycle of length at least 4 has a chord 
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‘Ike-building(Z’, G) 
Input: A propositional theory T and its constraint graph G. 
Output: A tree representation of all the models of T. 
Step 1. 
Step 2. 
Step 3. 
Step 4. 
Step 5. 
Use the triangulation algorithm to generate a chordal constraint graph. 
Identify all the maximal cliques in the graph. Let Cl,. . . , C, be all such 
cliques indexed by the rank of their highest nodes. 
Connect each Ci to an ancestor Cj (j < i) with whom it shares the largest 
set of letters. The resulting graph is called a join tree. 
Compute Mi, the set of models over Ci that satisfy the set of all formulas 
from T composed only of letters in Ci. 
For each Ci and for each Cj adjacent to Ci in the join tree, delete from Mi 
every model M that has no model in Mj that agrees with it on the set of 
their common letters (this amounts to performing arc consistency on the join 
tree). 
Fig. C. I. Propositional tree-clustering: tree-building phase. 
Once the tree is built it always allows an efficient query-answering process, that is, the 
cost of answering many types of queries is linear in the size of the tree generated [9]. 
The query-processing phase is described below (m bounds the number of submodels for 
each clique) : 
Propositional tree-clustering-query processing. 
(1) T is satisfiable iff none of the Mi is empty, a property that can be checked in 
O(n). 
(2) To see whether there is a model in which some letter P is true (respectively 
false), we arbitrarily select a clique containing P and test whether one of its 
models satisfies (respectively does not satisfy) P. This amounts to scanning a 
column in a table, and thus will be linear in m. To check whether a set of letters 
A is satisfied by some common model, we test whether all the letters belong to 
one cluster Ci. If SO, we check whether there is a model in Mi that satisfies 
A. Otherwise, if the letters are scattered over several cliques, we temporarily 
eliminate from each such clique all models that disagree with A, and then re- 
apply arc consistency. A model satisfying A exists iff none of the resulting Mi 
becomes empty. The complexity of this step is O( 1 Alnm log m) . 
We next summarize how tree-clustering can be applied to default reasoning within 
the class 2-DT25 (now n stands for the number of symbols in the default theory, m for 
the number of submodels in each clique; note that m is bounded by the number of the 
extensions that the theory has): 
25 The process described here can be applied to any default theory. The complexity analysis is the only issue 
appropriate only for 2-DTs. 
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(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
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Translate the default theory into a propositional theory T (See Section 5.1) 
Build a default database from the propositional formulas using the tree-building 
method (takes O( ITI n* * exp( w* + 1) ) time, where ITI is the size of the theory 
generated at Step I 1. 
Answer queries on the default theory using the produced tree: 
(a) 
(b) 
(cl 
To answer whether there is an extension, test whether there is an empty 
clique. If so, no extension exists (bounded by 0( n*) steps). 
To find an extension, solve the tree in a backtrack-free manner: Pick an 
arbitrary node C; in the join tree, select a model Mi from M;, select from 
each of its neighbors Cj a model M., that agrees with Mi on common letters, 
combine all these models, and continue to the neighbors’s neighbors, and so 
on. The set of all models can be generated by exhausting all combinations 
of submodels that agree on their common letters (finding one model is 
bounded by O( n* * m) steps). 
To answer whether there is an extension that satisfies a clause c of size k, 
check whether there is a model satisfying 
(this takes 0( k2n2m log m) steps). To answer whether c is included in all 
the extensions, check whether there is a solution that satisfies 
(bounded by 0( k’n’m logm) steps). 
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